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Abstract
We examine how the structure of terror networks varies with legal limits on interro-
gation and the ability of authorities to extract information from detainees. We assume
that terrorist networks are designed to respond optimally to a trade-oﬀ caused by in-
formation exchange: Diﬀusing information widely leads to greater internal eﬃciency,
but it leaves the organization more vulnerable to law enforcement. The extent of this
vulnerability depends on the law enforcement authority’s resources, strategy and in-
terrogation methods. Recognizing that the structure of a terrorist network responds
to the policies of law enforcement authorities allows us to begin to explore the most
eﬀective policies from the authorities’ point of view.
1 Introduction
Apprehending terrorists and extracting information from them and, in particular, the dif-
ferent investigation and interrogation methods used are the topics of an ongoing debate
which once again took center stage upon the start of the U.S. war on terror.1 In this article,
we do not aim to examine the ethical and legal aspects of the debate, but, highlight the
fact that the eﬃcacy of diﬀerent methods may vary to the extent that the structure of
terror networks strategically adapts to diﬀerent law enforcement policies.
The starting point for our work is the observation that the way terrorist networks are
designed is the result of a trade-oﬀ: Diﬀusing information throughout the organization
∗Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 W Fourth Street, New
York, NY 10012. Email addresses: mbaccara@stern.nyu.edu and heski@nyu.edu.
1A similar debate took place, for example, at the beginning of the 1900s, during the engagement of the
U.S. against the Spanish colony in the Philippines. The media reported cruelties against Filipino prisoners
to gather information on the counter-insurgency (see “The Water Cure" by P. Kramer, The New Yorker,
2/25/2008).
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allows it to operate more successfully, but it leaves the organization more vulnerable to
law enforcement detection. In choosing their design, terror organizations act as strategic
entities that respond optimally to the policies implemented by the authorities. Empirically,
it certainly appears that protecting information is a crucial concern of terror networks since
their survival depends on how eﬀective they are in preventing information leakage. The
available evidence suggests that terror network are characterized by a fairly decentralized
“cell” structure; however, there are some agents that appear to hold more information than
others (which we term an “informational hub”).2
In this article, we first aim to describe how authorities should expect the organization
to respond strategically to alternative policies. In particular, we highlight the role and
the consequences of investigation and interrogation methods on the information structure
of the terror organization. Given our findings, we take the authorities’ point of view and
discuss the problem of choosing the most eﬀective policy to fight terror networks.
It is worth highlighting from the outset, what we mean by the “network” and the costs
and benefits of “informational links.”3 We focus on a directed network and, specifically, if
Bob is linked to Ann, this should be understood as Ann having some information about
Bob. This information could, for example, allow Ann to ensure that Bob acts in the in-
terests of the group. Examples of this kind of information include identity, whereabouts,
or incriminating evidence about a person.4 We view the network of who holds such infor-
mation as independent of the other structures that coexist within the organization. For
example, planning, decision-making, coordinating activity and communication can take
place under code-names.5 In that case, coordinating actions can be quite independent of
who within the organization knows the real name or whereabouts of other members of the
2See, for instance, Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2002).
3 In particular, within any organization (and terrorist organizations are no exception) many networks
coexist simultaneously and often interact: ranging from the network of decision-making authority, to com-
munication networks, “productive networks” who act and work together, and more informal networks based
on social interactions. Moreover, networks can vary in whether they are directed (for example, an authority
network where Ann may be able to veto Bob’s decisions) or undirected (for example. if Ann is Bob’s cousin,
then it’s a safe bet that Bob is Ann’s cousin).
4Though these examples are drawn from gangs and crime rather than from terrorist structures, Thomp-
son (2005), for example, describes that in his role as a journalist reporting on organized crime, he had
to divulge his address and that of his close family members. Charlie (2002) describes how committing a
murder in front of peers is often an initiation ritual used by U.S. gang members.
5 Indeed, this was exactly what was done, for example, by the Italian resistance in WWII (see, for instance,
Oliva (1976)) . Moreover, the investigations on Al-Qaeda suggest that the same Al-Qaeda member often
uses diﬀerent names depending on whom he is interacting with, as described, for instance, in the account
of the investigation following Daniel Pearl’s murder in Pearl (2003).
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organization. However, the diﬀusion of this kind of information clearly has implications
both for the extent of trust (and the eﬃcient functioning of the organization) and the
organization’s vulnerability with respect to its enemies.
In the model, we simply assume a fixed benefit of linking one member of the orga-
nization to another. This benefit can be viewed as arising from the enhanced ability of
the organization to discipline such a member, leading to better outcomes from the group’s
perspective.6 Here, we devote more attention to fleshing out the costs of the network, and
how they respond to law enforcement policies. In particular, we suppose that individuals
within the organization are directly vulnerable according to the authorities’ investigation
policies. Further, if caught, then a member of the network will jeopardize other members
of the network, depending on the extent to which he has information about them (that is,
depending on whether they are linked to him), and depending on the law enforcement’s
ability to extract such information through interrogations.
Since we view the structure of the network as designed in response to the costs (of
vulnerability to the authorities) and benefits of information links, we can characterize the
network that arises in any set of circumstances, and show how diﬀerent law enforcement
capabilities, resources or policies aﬀect the structure of the terrorist network. In particular,
we show that both centralized and decentralized networks can arise as optimal responses to
investigation policies. On the one hand, given a certain investigation budget, the optimal
network tends to be more decentralized when the authorities invest similar resources to
seek each agent. On the other hand, when the budget is allocated asymmetrically, the
optimal organization is a mixed structure in which one cell acts as “information hub”
and holds information about a certain number of members of the organization. However,
there are other members of the organization that remain independent from the hub and
are organized in binary cells. We also find that sometimes, as the interrogation techniques
become harsher, the terror network responds by increasing the number of cells in the mixed
structure. Therefore, our results suggest that there are circumstances in which harsher
interrogation methods do not change the number of links in the organization (and, so, do
not aﬀect its operation), but just have the eﬀect of increasing the degree of decentralization
in the way information is shared in the network.
After we characterize the eﬀect of diﬀerent policies on network structure, we can turn
to the assessment of the authorities’ policies and, therefore, to the characterization of the
6Such a benefit is derived endogenously in Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2008).
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optimal policies. Our results suggest that the three instruments available to the author-
ities (investigation methods, interrogation methods and severity of punishments) are not
independent but are strategically interrelated. If interrogation methods and severity of
punishments are bounded by legal limits, the investigation methods should be tailored to
the legal environment. We show the circumstances under which a symmetric investigation
strategy (i.e., allocating the same budget to detect all potential members of the organiza-
tion) is optimal, and we also look at how optimal investigation strategies vary with changes
in the legal environment within which the authorities act. In particular, we find that as
legal limits broaden, the cost of a link in a binary cell increases. This makes it more likely
that a symmetric allocation of the investigation budget can prevent any links from arising.
However, as legal boundaries become narrower, it is more likely that a symmetric budget
allocation leads to a fully eﬃcient allocation. In this case, we show that the authorities
can do better by pursuing an asymmetrical investigation strategy.
1.1 Related Literature
This article builds on Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2008), which introduced a model that is more
explicit on how information links lead to trust within the organization, and that allows for
the probability of detection to vary with the extent of a terrorist’s cooperation with the
organization. Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2008) also provides some additional discussion of as-
sumptions, and considers a number of extensions. Here, we simplify the model in a number
of respects–in particular, in presenting a reduced form benefit for an informational link–
and extend the model to consider variety in interrogation methods. To our knowledge, this
work is the first to address the optimal information structure in organizations subject to
an external threat.
To our knowledge, this is the first article that addresses a terror network’s strategic
response to changes in the investigation and interrogation methods. However, several
papers have some elements that are related to our work. Farley (2003, 2006) considers
the robustness of a terrorist cell. In that work, robustness is with regard to maintaining a
chain of command in a hierarchy. Garoupa (2007) looks at the organizational problem of
an illegal activity and at the trade-oﬀ between enhancing internal productivity and leaving
members of the organization more exposed to detection. He takes a diﬀerent approach,
focusing on the optimal size of the criminal organization and taking its internal structure
as given.
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This paper is also related to the literature on social networks. In particular, Ballester
et al. (2006), under the assumptions that the network structure is exogenously given
and observed, characterize the “key player”–the player who, once removed, leads to the
optimal change in aggregate activity. In this paper, instead, we start by asking how a
network can be (endogenously) built to make criminal activity as eﬃcient as possible.
2 Model
Suppose that there are N > 2 members in a terrorist organization, with N an even number
and a single law enforcement agency.7 The law enforcement authority acts first and sets a
given detection strategy as specified in Section 2.1. The N terrorists have the possibility of
forming an information structure by exchanging information among themselves as specified
below in Section 2.2.8 After forming an information structure, the N terrorists generate
the benefits described in Section 2.2. Finally, detection takes place.
The assumption that the law enforcement authority chooses its policies before the
terror structure is formed can be justified on the grounds that law enforcement policies
and investigating budgets are broadly laid out and are hard to fine-tune once a certain
policy is in place.
2.1 Law Enforcement Agency
At the end of the game, each terrorist can be detected by the enforcement agency. If the
terrorist is detected, this imposes a direct cost to the organization of k > 0. This cost
may include a punishment for the individual, such as time in prison, and a cost to the
organization of recruiting a new member.
There are two ways for a terrorist to be detected, a direct way and an indirect way.
In particular, an independent Bernoulli random draw determines whether a particular
terrorist is detected directly. The direct detection of a particular terrorist at each period is
7Allowing N to be an odd number presents no conceptual diﬃculties, but adds to the number of cases
that need be considered in some of the results with regard to how to treat the last odd agent, with no real
gain in insight.
8We assume that the N agents constitute an organization through some other production structure that
is independent of the information structure. Although we do not explicitly model the formation process,
one could assume that the information structure is determined by a “benevolent” third party. Indeed, this
is essentially the approach advocated by Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, an Al-Qaeeda strategist who suggested
that cell-builders be from outside the locale or immediately go on suicide missions after building cells.
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independent of other terrorists’ detection. Thus, a terrorist i can be detected directly by
the authority according to some probability αi. This probability depends on the extent of
the enforcement agency’s scrutiny of terrorist i.
Second, the law enforcement authority might also detect terrorists indirectly. Indeed, we
assume that when the agency detects a terrorist who has information about other members
of the organization, the agency also detects each of these with probability γ ∈ (0, 1]. First,
note that this implies that the enforcement agency’s ability to detect terrorists indirectly
depends on the structure of the terror group. Second, γ is a parameter that depends on
the ability of the law enforcement agency to extract information from detected terrorists.
For instance, the parameter γ is determined by the interrogation methods and the ability
to strike deals with prisoners in exchange for information.
The law enforcement agency has a budget B ∈ [0, N ] to allocate for investigating the
N members of the organization and devotes αi ∈ [0, 1] to investigating member i where
NX
i=1
αi ≤ B. Without loss of generality, we label terrorists so that α1 ≤ α2 ≤ ... ≤ αN . We
refer to αi as the enforcement agency’s level of scrutiny (or investigation) of terrorist i.
2.2 Information Structure
We assume that each of the terrorists has a piece of private and verifiable information
about himself and can decide to disclose this information to any of the other terrorists.
Examples of such information could be the identity of the player, his whereabouts, some
incriminating evidence, etc. We formalize the fact that i holds such information about j by
an indicator variable μij , such that μij = 1 if and only if i knows the information regarding
j (μij = 0 otherwise). We use the notation j → i to represent μij = 1 (and, similarly,
for instance i, j, k → l to represent μli = μlj = μlk = 1).9 The set I of all the possible
organization (or “information”) structures among N people is a subset of the set {0, 1}N2
of values of the indicator variables, and we denote by μ its generic element.
We suppose that if μij = 1 for some i 6= j this yields a benefit t for the organization.
The idea here is that when someone in the organization holds information about j, it leads
to more trust within the organization and, in particular, induces terrorist j to cooperate
with the organization’s goals, and yielding a benefit t to the organization. “Trust” and a
benefit of a link in ensuring trust can be formalized in the context of cooperation in the
9Note that μii = 1 for all i.
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infinitely-repeated Prisoners’ dilemma–a standard approach in economics toolkit–and
under the assumption that when i has information about j he can more easily punish him
for not cooperating. A full discussion can be found in Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2008).
A terrorist i is said to be indirectly linked to a terrorist j if there is a path of direct
links that connect i to j. That is, if there is a set of terrorists {h1, .., hn} such that i→ h1,
h1 → h2, .., hn → j.
The information structure aﬀects the terrorists’ probabilities of getting caught by the
enforcement agency. Specifically, if i has information about another member of the orga-
nization j, and i is detected (either directly or indirectly), player j is also detected with
probability γ. As discussed in Section 2.1, if a terrorist i is detected and there is a single
path of length d from terrorist i to terrorist j, j0s probability of indirect detection as a
result of i’s capture is decaying in d and, more precisely, is γd. Note, however, that there
could be multiple paths from i to j, and the total probability of detection of i depends on
all of them.
Recall from Section 2.1 that each terrorist i is detected by the enforcement agency
directly with probability αi and indirectly as just discussed above. Overall, given an
information structure μ, let βi (μ) be the total probability of detection of terrorist i.
In Figure 1, we give three examples of information structures. Panel A represents a de-
centralized structure in which terrorists are arranged in disconnected “cells” within which
terrorists are linked to each other. Panel B represents a centralized structure (or “hierar-
chy”), in which terrorist 1 holds information on all other terrorists. Panel C represents a
structure in which terrorists 1 and 2 form a cell, and the other two terrorists are connected
to terrorist 1 in a hierarchical fashion.
If we assume that αi = α for i = 1, .., 4, in the information structure represented by
Panel A in Figure 1, the probability of detection for each terrorist is βi(μ) = α+α(1−α)γ
for i = 1, .., 4. The first term is the probability of direct detection, while the second
term is the probability of indirect detection. Note that indirect detection occurs if the
terrorist is not detected directly (with probability (1−α)), the other member of the cell is
caught directly (with probability α), and the authority is able to extract information (with
probability γ).
In the information structure represented by Panel B in Figure 1, the probability of
detection for terrorist 1 is α, since terrorist 1 cannot be detected indirectly. However,
βi(μ) = α + α(1 − α)γ for i = 2, 3, 4. Again, the first term is the probability of direct
detection, while the second term is the probability of indirect detection.
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Figure 1:
For the structure in Panel C, terrorists 1 and 2 form a cell, and their probability of
detection is βi(μ) = α+α(1−α)γ, while terrorists 3 and 4 can be detected if either terrorist
1 or 2 is detected. In particular, for i = 3, 4 we have
βi(μ) = α+ (1− α)αγ + (1− α)2αγ2 (1)
The first term of (1) is the probability of direct detection of terrorist i. The second
term refers to the event in which terrorist 1 is detected directly and terrorist i is not. In
this case, terrorist i is detected with probability γ. Finally, the third term represents the
event in which terrorist 2 is detected directly, while terrorists 1 and i are not. In this
case, terrorist i is detected with probability γ2.(since terrorist 1 would first need to be
detected as a result of terrorist 2’s capture, and then the authority would need to extract
the information from terrorist 1).
2.3 Payoﬀs
The payoﬀ for the terror organization is given by the sum of the benefits generated by the
links (t for every linked member), minus the expected cost of direct and indirect detection.
Bringing together benefits and costs, we can write down the net payoﬀs to the organization
of an information structure μ as:
Πi(μ) = tn(μ)−
NX
i=1
kβi (μ) , (2)
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where n(μ) denotes the number of members of the organization who are linked to some
other member of the organization under the information structure μ. Note that the total
probability of detection βi (μ) depends on the probabilities of direct detections {αj}, the
information structure μ, and the decay parameter γ.
We assume that the goal of the enforcement agency is to minimize the trust among the
N terrorists. In other words, to minimize n(μ) and the benefits that the terror organization
obtains from linking its members to each other. For simplicity, we assume that the authority
gets no utility from saving part of the budget B. Also, the enforcement agency does not
benefit from the the payments k incurred by the detected terrorists.10
Baccara and Bar-Isaac (2008) provides some further justification and extensive discus-
sion on the benefits of links and on potential extensions and developments of the model.
3 The Optimal Network
In this section, we study how a strategic terror organization chooses its structure, given
that a specific enforcement policy is in place. In particular, we take the authority’s scrutiny
{α1, ..., αN} as given, and we study the most eﬃcient information structure that the N
terrorists can form. These characterizations will allow us to tackle the problem of the
government’s optimal behavior.11
In characterizing the optimal information structures, it is useful to begin by focusing on
optimal structures given a fixed number of terrorists “linked” to other terrorists–that is, a
fixed number of terrorists that disclose their information to at least one other terrorist. Note
that the benefits of having terrorists linked depend only on their number rather than on
the structure of the organization. In particular, the potential benefit that the organization
can yield from the links is constant with respect to all the information structures with the
same number of terrorists linked to someone else. Thus, if the number of linked terrorists
is fixed, an optimal organization minimizes the cost of information leakage.
We begin by characterizing the optimal information structure when the number of
10 Indeed, these payments may be costly for the enforcement agency. For example, they may consist of
detention in prison facilities.
11Note that even though we assume that the enforcement agency determines the level of scrutiny, these
probabilities could also be exogenously given and due to some intrinsic characteristics of the agents. For
example, some members of the organization may be more talented in evading detection (some may have a
cleaner criminal record or simply might be able to run faster). If this is the case, the optimal organization
characterizations we provide in this section can be seen as self-contained.
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linked terrorists n is strictly less than N in the next Proposition.
Proposition 1 The optimal structure to link n < N terrorists is a hierarchy with the
terrorist with the lowest probability of detection at the top, and the n terrorists with the
highest probabilities of detection linked to him (i.e., N,N − 1, ..., N − n+ 1 −→ 1).
If the number of linked terrorists is less than N , the optimal structure is simply a
hierarchy in which the top (the terrorist who receives the information from the others) is
the member with the lowest probability of detection and the n < N “linked” terrorists
are those with the n highest probability of detection. The proof of Proposition 1 is very
simple. Recall that, without loss of generality, we have α1 ≤ α2 ≤ ... ≤ αN . Suppose,
first, that n = 1, so we need to find the way to generate the “cheapest” possible link in
terms of information leakage costs. The only event in which this link becomes costly is
the case in which member i is independently detected and member j is not. This event
has probability αi(1− αj). Then, the cost of the link is minimized when αi is as small as
possible and αj is as large as possible. It follows that the “cheapest” possible link is the
one that requires member N to disclose his information to member 1 (the link N → 1).
If n = 2, the second cheapest link one can generate after N → 1 is N − 1 → 1, and so
on. Notice that Proposition 1 implies that the information leakage cost under an optimal
structure in which there are n < N links is simply kα1γ
Pn
i=1 (1− αN−i+1) + k
PN
i=1 αi.
Next, consider the case where all N terrorists are linked to someone else. To start the
characterization, consider a cell {i, j}. Let ρ(i, j) ≡ αi+αj−2αiαj2−αi−αj . This is a useful ratio in
understanding the organization members’ proclivity to be linked as a binary cell rather
than as subordinates to another terrorist. If two members {i, j} are in a cell, terrorist i
will get caught and the organization suﬀers the cost k with probability αi + (1− αi)αjγ.
However, if each of them is independently linked to a third terrorist (the same for both,
and who may be linked to others) with overall probability of detection η, terrorist i will
get caught and the organization will suﬀer a cost k with probability αi + ηγ (1− αi), and
terrorist j will get caught with probability αj + ηγ (1− αj) . Then, having the terrorists
{i, j} forming an independent cell rather than linking each of them to the third terrorist
minimizes the cost of information leakage if and only if
αi + (1− αi)αjγ + αj + (1− αj)αiγ < αi + ηγ (1− αi) + αj + ηγ (1− αj) (3)
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or, equivalently,
ρ(i, j) =
αi + αj − 2αiαj
2− αi − αj
< η. (4)
Thus, for any couple of terrorists, the higher is ρ(i, j), the greater is the advantage of
forming a cell rather than being linked to a third terrorist. Note that ρ(i, j) is decreasing
in both αi and αj–that is, the higher the probability of detection of a terrorist, the lower
ρ(i, j) of any cell to which he might belong. Note, also, that ρ(i, j) does not depend on
γ. This is because decaying probabilities of detection aﬀect the optimality of indepen-
dence for a cell only if linking themselves to a third terrorist creates indirect links in the
organization–that is, if it aﬀects the probability η.
We now characterize the optimal information structure with N linked terrorists in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 The optimal information structure with N linked terrorists is described as
follows. Let i∗ ∈ {2, ..,N} be the largest even integer such that ρ(i−1, i) > α1+(1− α1)α2γ
(if no such integer exists, set i∗ = 1): All the terrorists i = 1, .., i∗ are arranged in binary
cells as 1↔ 2, 3←→ 4, .., i∗ − 1←→ i∗, and the terrorists i = i∗ + 1, .., N all reveal their
information to terrorist 1, that is, i∗ + 1, .., N → 1.
Proposition 2 states that the optimal way to link N members in a terror organization
is to divide the members into two groups according to their probabilities of detection: a
group comprising the i∗ members with the lowest probabilities of detection, and another
group with the N − i∗ members with the highest probability of detection. The members
belonging to the first group are arranged in binary cells formed by members with adjacent
probability of detection (i.e. 1↔ 2, 3←→ 4, .., i∗ − 1←→ i∗). All the members belonging
to the second group reveal their information to terrorist 2 (i∗ + 1, .., N → 1↔ 2).
The number of terrorists i∗ belonging to the independent cell component depends on
how steeply the ratio ρ(i, i + 1) of each couple grows. If α1 and α2 are very low relative
to the other terrorists’ probabilities of detection, it could be the case that ρ(i − 1, i) >
α1+(1− α1)α2γ for all i = 4, .., N . In this case, Proposition 2 requires that an optimizing
organization links all the members 3, .., N to terrorist 1 (who remains linked in a cell with
2).12 However, if α3 and α4 are close enough to α2, then ρ(3, 4) > α2 + (1− α2)α1γ, and
12 In particular, if α1 and α2 approach zero, all these links have an arbitrarily small information leakage
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Figure 2:
Proposition 2 prescribes 3 and 4 to form a cell rather than being linked to 1, and so on.
The optimal information structure described in Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 2,
when there are N = 8 terrorists and i∗ = 6.
Note that with a full characterization of the form of optimal structures, we can easily
calculate the information leakage of linking n terrorists and inducing them to cooperate.
Comparing costs and benefits of links then allows us to characterize the optimal information
structure.
Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 allow us to define the net benefit to the organization of
having n links. In particular, if the organization has N links, this yields a direct “trust”
benefit of Nt, a direct cost of k
NX
i=1
αi of detection, and a cost of indirect detection: For
a terrorist i (from i∗ + 1 to N) who is subordinate to the 1←→ 2 informational hub, the
cost of indirect detection is k(α1γ + α2(1− α1)γ2)(1− αi), whereas for a terrorist 2i in a
cell with terrorist 2i − 1, the cost of indirect detection is kγ(1 − α2i)α2i−1. Summing all
benefits and costs over all terrorists, we can obtain that the value to an organization of
having all N terrorists linked (in the most eﬃcient way) is:
V (N) =
Nt− k
NX
i=1
αi − k(α1γ + α2(1− α1)γ2)
PN
i=i∗+1(1− αi)
−kγ
P i∗
2
i=1 [(1− α2i−1)α2i + (1− α2i)α2i−1]
. (5)
cost, so the organization’s information leakage cost is the same as in the structure with no links.
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Similarly we can write V (n) = nt−k
NX
i=1
αi−kγα1
PN
j=N−n+1(1−αj) for n ∈ {1, ..., N−1}
and V (0) = −k
NX
i=1
αi.
With expressions for the value of having n links, we can, therefore, find the number
of links n∗ that maximizes the value of the organization, V (n). The following proposition
follows trivially from the earlier results and characterizes the optimal information structure.
Proposition 3 If γ = 1, the optimal information structure is as follows: (i) If n∗ = 0,
the optimal information structure is an anarchy. (ii) If 0 < n∗ < N , the optimal structure
is an individual-dominated hierarchy where the hub is terrorist 1 and the subordinates are
terrorists N, ...N − n + 1. (iii) Finally, if n∗ = N , the optimal structure is the mixed
structure described in Proposition 2.
Note that when αi = α for all i, the additional cost of each link is constant and equal
to kγα(1−α). It follows that, in this symmetric case, the optimal structure either consists
of no links or all terrorists are in binary cells.
Corollary 4 Let αi = α for all i. If t > kγα(1−α), then the optimal information structure
is a binary cell structure. Otherwise, the optimal information structure has no links.
This concludes the characterization of the optimal information structure for a given
scrutiny distribution {α1, .., αN}. Next, we endogenize scrutiny and discuss the strategy
of the enforcement agency.
4 The Enforcement Agency
The enforcement agency aims to minimize production within the criminal organization.
To do so, the agency has several instruments to aﬀect how criminal organizations operate.
First, as discussed in Section 2.1, the enforcement agency has a budget B to allocate to
detect terrorists.
Second, two further parameters in our model aﬀect the enforcement agency’s ability to
minimize cooperation within the organization. These parameters are γ, which measures
how eﬀective the interrogation techniques are in extracting information from detected ter-
rorists, and k, which measures the severity of the punishment for detected terrorists. Note
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that both these parameters are typically constrained by legal limits. Thus, the parameters
(γ, k) can be viewed as describing the legal environment in which authorities act and the
eﬀectiveness of their interrogation methods.
In this section, first we study how these three instruments should be used and how they
are interrelated. In particular, we first show how, for any fixed legal environment (γ, k),
an authority should optimally allocate its investigation budget to minimize cooperation
within the organization–that is, to minimize the number of linked terrorists. Next, we
look at how a criminal organization is likely to strategically respond to changes of γ and
k–that is, changes in the legal environment–and, in turn, how the optimal investigation
budget allocation should be optimally altered in response to such legal changes.
4.1 Investigation Budget Allocation
As discussed in Section 2.3, we assume that the enforcement agency’s objective is to min-
imize the number of terrorists who cooperate–that is, the organization’s production level
n∗t, where n∗ maximizes the value of the organization, V (n).
Recall that, for a given legal environment (γ, k), the problem of the law enforcement
agency is to allocate the investigation budgetB ∈ [0,N ] to determine the scrutiny αi ∈ [0, 1]
of each terrorist i such that
PN
i=1 αi ≤ B. The enforcement agency acts first and chooses
these scrutiny levels before the organization forms.
In the next result, we characterize the (weakly) optimal strategy for the enforcement
agency in allocating its resources. Note that, if the authority allocates the same budget α
to each terrorist, the cost of each link becomes kγα(1−α). Since this cost is maximized at
α = 12 , it is never optimal to set α >
1
2 in a symmetric allocation. Let, then, bα = min{BN , 12}
be the optimal symmetric allocation.
Proposition 5 A weakly optimal strategy for the enforcement agency is to set scrutiny
symmetrically if kγbα(1 − bα) > t and to not investigate one terrorist and investigate all
others symmetrically (set α1 = 0 and α2 = ... = αN = min{ BN−1 , 1}) otherwise.
A symmetric allocation of B can prevent the formation of any link if the cost of each
link kγbα(1 − bα) is greater than the benefit of inducing an individual to cooperate. This
is the case when kγbα(1 − bα) > t, and, in these circumstances, a symmetric allocation is
optimal as it deters any cooperation.
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However, if kγbα(1 − bα) < t, by Lemma 4, a symmetric allocation would imply the
formation of a binary cell structure that reaches full cooperation within the organization.
The question is whether, in these situations, the enforcement agency can do something else
to prevent full cooperation. Proposition 5 addresses this question and suggests that, in
this case, an allocation in which one terrorist remains undetected and the budget is equally
divided among the other N − 1 terrorists is optimal. Under this allocation, sometimes the
organization still reaches full eﬃciency (in this case, we can conclude that the enforcement
agency cannot prevent full eﬃciency for the terror network), but in some cases, a hierarchy
with N − 1 links arises. Since the hierarchy is strictly less eﬃcient than a binary cell
structure, this allocation strictly dominates the symmetric one.
If kγbα(1 − bα) > t, we show that there is no other allocation that strictly dominates
α1 = 0 and α2 = ... = αN = min{ BN−1 , 1}.13 The intuition for this part of Proposition 5 is
the following. First of all, note that if two terrorists remain undetected (α1 = α2 = 0), the
organization can form N links without incurring any additional information leakage costs
with respect to the cost they would incur with no links (this is because the two terrorists
can reveal information to each other at no cost and costlessly act as a hub for the N − 2
terrorists). So, to deter full eﬃciency, the enforcement agency can leave, at most, one
terrorist undetected. Suppose now that some cooperation is deterred by an allocation in
which all terrorists are detected with some probability (α1 > 0). Then, the terrorist with
the lowest allocation will act as a hub in a hierarchy, as described in Proposition 1. In the
Appendix, we prove that under our assumption, there are exactly N − 1 links in such a
hierarchy. Then, moving all the resources from the hub to the other terrorists, as suggested
in Proposition 5, is equivalent to the original allocation.
Let us turn to comment on the cooperation or trust outcomes in equilibrium. Proposi-
tion 5 states that in some circumstances (i.e., if kγbα(1− bα) ≥ t), the enforcement agency
can prevent any cooperation in the organization by allocating its budget symmetrically.
Note that these circumstances are more likely to occur when k is higher, or the benefit from
trust t is lower. However, a higher budget B is beneficial as long as it is below the threshold
N
2 . Increases in B beyond that threshold would have no further eﬀect on the cooperation
level in the organization. On the other hand, when kγbα(1− bα) < t, the optimal detection
strategy for the authority deters, at most, one link and the trust in or cooperation of one
terrorist in the organization.
13Note that considering min{ BN−1 , 1} guarantees that the resulting allocation on each agent is in the
interval [0, 1].
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4.2 Legal Environment and Interrogation Methods
Two parameters in our model directly describe the legal environment within which the
authorities act. In particular, the parameter γ measures the probability with which an
agent in the hands of the authority reveals the information he knows, and the parameter k
measures the severity of the punishment inflicted on the detected agents. Thus, a broad-
ening of the admissible measures (such as, for example, the Patriot Act) can be captured
in this model as an increase of γ or k, or both.
In this section, we look at how a criminal organization is likely to strategically respond
to changes of γ and k and, in turn, how eﬀective such changes are and which investigation
budget allocation should be optimally associated with them.
First, let us look at how, given a budget detection allocation {α1, ..., αN}, a change in
the legal environment aﬀects the optimal information structure. Examples of change in
legal environments include banning the use of torture, and allowing reduced sentences and
rewards for whistle-blowers.
From the results in Section 3, the eﬀect of changes in γ on the optimal information
structure is described in the following Proposition.
Proposition 6 1. If γ < γ, the optimal organization structure is a mixed strategy as
described in Proposition 2, where the number of binary cells in the structure is in-
creasing in γ.
2. If γ < γ ≤ γ, a simple hierarchy as described in Proposition 1 is optimal. The number
of linked agent is decreasing in γ.
3. If γ > γ, the optimal information structure has no links.
Proposition 6 suggests that for low levels of γ, an increase in γ does not have the
eﬀect of decreasing cooperation within the organization, but has the eﬀect of increasing
decentralization. However, suﬃciently high increases in γ reduce the number of linked
terrorists and make a simple hierarchy optimal.
To understand the argument behind point (1) of Proposition 6, recall from Proposition 2
that the optimal number of terrorists organized in cells is found by defining i∗ ∈ {2, .., N}
as the largest even integer such that ρ(i − 1, i) > α1 + (1− α1)α2γ. Since ρ(i − 1, i) is
independent of γ, an increase in γ increases i∗ and, thus, the number of resulting cells.
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Proposition 6 has significant policy implications. Suppose that an asymmetric detec-
tion strategy is in place, and the criminal organization responds with a partially centralized
structure, as described in Proposition 2. In such a structure, there are two agents (i.e.,
agents 1 and 2) who, directly or indirectly, hold a significant amount of information about
other members of the organization. Thus, authorities may expect that toughening the
interrogation methods (as, for example, by allowing the use of torture) will lead to more
information being revealed following capture of such a critical member of the terror orga-
nization. However, our approach views the terror network as a strategic agent that will
optimally respond to such environmental change. In particular, Proposition 6 suggests
that there are circumstances under which the toughening of interrogation methods will
fail to achieve less cooperation within the organization, and it will simply lead to more
decentralization in the way information is shared among the members.
Next, we consider how an increase in the severity of the punishment (measured in our
model by k) aﬀects the optimal structure of the organization.
Proposition 7 1. If k < k, a mixed structure as described in Proposition 2 is optimal.
The number of binary cells in the structure is constant in k.
2. If k ≤ k < k, a simple hierarchy as described in Proposition 1 is optimal. The number
of linked agents is decreasing in k.
3. If k > k, the optimal information structure has no links.
Propositions 6 and 7 suggest that, while a change in the interrogation methods (i.e., a
change in γ) can lead to a more decentralized organization, a change in the severity of the
punishment (i.e., a change in k) never has this eﬀect.
Next, we look at how the enforcement agency should optimally adjust the optimal
detection strategy {α1, .., αN} after a change in the legal environment (γ, k).
Proposition 8 Following an increase of γ or k, a symmetric investigation budget alloca-
tion is more likely to be optimal.
The intuition behind Proposition 8 is simple. Given an investigation budget B, by
broadening the legal limits and increasing γ or k (or both), the cost to the terror orga-
nization of a link in the binary cell structure increases. This makes it more likely that
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any cooperation within the organization can be prevented by a symmetric allocation of the
budget B.
Although Proposition 8 is a direct consequence of Proposition 5, it oﬀers interesting
insights from a policy perspective. Indeed, this result suggests that the three instruments
available to the authorities (investigation budget allocation, interrogation methods and
severity of punishments) are not independent but are strategically interrelated. Thus, any
change in the legal environment should be associated with a revised investigation budget
allocation. In particular, if the legal environment broadens the legal limits within which
the authorities can act (i.e., an increase in γ and k), a symmetric budget allocation is more
likely to be optimal than before. However, if the legal limits for the authorities become
narrower, it is more likely that a symmetric allocation will lead to a fully linked binary cell
structure. Thus, the authorities could do better by implementing an asymmetric detection
strategy as described in Proposition 5.
5 Extensions and Conclusions
In the framework outlined above, we assumed that the law enforcement authority acts
first, and the terrorist organization chooses a structure in response. Another possibility
is that the authority might choose its strategy first, the organization then forms, and
the authority’s strategy is then realized. If the authority is restriced to choose a pure
strategy, this timing assumption leads to results equivalent to this paper’s. However, if the
authority can choose mixed strategies then this timing assumption is substantive and can
lead to more eﬀective strategies for the enforcement agency. For example, suppose that
there are only two agents in the organization. Randomizing between choosing scrutinies
of (0, 1) and (1, 0) is more likely to the deter creation of a binary cell than a symmetric
allocation of (12 ,
1
2). However, in the case where there are many agents, then a symmetric
and deterministic allocation might be more likely to deter the creation of N or N − 1 links
than mixing asymmetric ones.
Numerous extensions to framework above might be considered. Baccara and Bar-Isaac
(2008) provides a more careful consideration of the benefits of informational links and
it considers a model where the a terrorist’s behavior can depend on his position in the
structure, and the probability of getting caught depends on behavior. Other potentially
interesting extensions of this framework include exploring the process of the formation of
the structure, and a more detailed and careful consideration of the costs to the organization
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of having members detected. In all these cases, the fundamental points will still apply:
The structure of a terrorist network responds (in a way that can be characterized) to law
enforcement policies, and these policies should be tailored to the legal environment.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 First step. Recall that ρ(j, i) is decreasing in both αj and αi. This follows
easily by taking the derivative of ρ(i.j) with respect to αi and αj and noting that 0 ≤ αi, αj ≤ 1.
Second step Let us prove that among all possible binary cell information structures that pair N
terrorists to each other {μ ∈ I s.t. if μij = 1 for some i 6= j then μji = 1 and μik = 0 ∀k 6= j}, the
one which minimizes information leakage costs is 1 ←→ 2, 3 ←→ 4,..., N − 1 ←→ N . To see this,
let us first show that this result holds for N = 4. The claim is true if 1 ←→ 2, 3 ←→ 4 is better
than either of the alternatives 1←→ 4, 2←→ 3 and 1←→ 3, 2←→ 4. This requires that:
k [α1 + (1− α1)α2γ + α2 + (1− α2)α1γ] + k [α3 + (1− α3)α4γ + α4 + (1− α4)α3γ] ≤
k [α1 + (1− α1)α4γ + α4 + (1− α4)α1γ] + k [α2 + (1− α2)α3γ + α3 + (1− α3)α2γ]
(6)
and,
k [α1 + (1− α1)α2γ + α2 + (1− α2)α1γ] + k [α3 + (1− α3)α4γ + α4 + (1− α4)α3γ] ≤
k [α1 + (1− α1)α3γ + α4 + (1− α3)α1γ] + k [α2 + (1− α2)α4γ + α4 + (1− α4)α2γ]
. (7)
Inequality (6) holds if α1α2 + α3α4 ≥ α1α4 + α2α3 or if (α4 − α2) (α3 − α1) ≥ 0, which is
always the case. Inequality (7) also always holds.
Now, suppose that for a general even N the claim is not true. Then, there is an optimal
structure in which it is possible to find 2 pairs {i1, i2} , {i3, i4} such that αi1 ≤ αi2 ≤ αi3 ≤ αi4 is
violated. Then, since that is the optimal structure, rearranging the terrorists in these pairs leaving
all other pairs unchanged cannot reduce information leakage costs. However, this contradicts the
result for N = 4.
Third step. It is clear that the best way to link terrorists 1 and 2 is to link them to each other
since they are the two lowest-probability terrorists. Now, for any couple {N − 1, N} , ..., {3, 4} let us
compare whether it is better from an information leakage point of view to link the pair to each other
and independently from the others, or to have them linked to terrorist 1 (and 2) instead. If the ter-
roristsN andN−1 are linked to each other, the cost of information leakage corresponding to the cou-
ple is k [αN−1 + (1− αN−1)αNγ + αN + (1− αN )αN−1γ]. If they are linked to terrorists 1 and 2,
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the cost of information leakage is k [αN−1 + (1− αN−1) (α1 + α2(1− α1)γ)γ + αN + (1− αN ) (α1 + α2(1− α1)γ)γ] .
Then, the couple {N − 1, N} should be linked to terrorist 1 (and then, since we have 1↔ 2, to the
couple {1, 2}) if and only if
ρ(N − 1,N) < (α1 + α2(1− α1)γ)γ (8)
If condition (8) fails, by the first step of this proof we know that the condition will fail for any
subsequent couple. Then, the optimal way to link the N terrorists to each other is to create a
pairwise structure and, by the second step of this proof, we know that the optimal way to do this
is to set 1↔ 2, 3←→ 4, .. and N ←→ N − 1. If condition (8) is satisfied, we can link terrorists N
and N − 1 to the couple {1, 2}, and we can repeat this check for the couple {N − 2, N − 3} . We
repeat this process until we find a couple {i− 1, i} for which the condition
ρ(i− 1, i) < (α1 + α2(1− α1)γ)γ (9)
fails. If we find such a couple, by the first step of this proof we know that the condition will fail for
any subsequent couple, and, by the second step of the proof, we can arrange any subsequent couple
in a pairwise fashion.¥
Proof of Proposition 5 In order to prove this result, we prove the following Lemma first. Leteα ≡ n0, BN−1 , .., BN−1o.
Lemma The allocation eα minimizes the net benefit of the Nth link (linking terrorist 1 to
terrorist 2) compared to any other allocation α which generates exactly N-1 links.
Proof: Consider any allocation α that generates exactly N − 1 links. Since α1 ≤ α2 ≤ ... ≤ αN
and α1 ≥ 0, it follows that α2 ≤ BN−1 . We can compare the additional information leakage costs
from the N − th link, V (N) = V (N) − V (N − 1) and eV (N) = eV (N − 1) − eV (N − 1) associated
with each terrorist i under allocations α and eα. In order to do that, let us consider the allocationbα ≡ {0, α2, .., αN} and first compare α with bα. Under the optimal information structures with N
links described in Proposition 2, given allocation α, either (a) terrorist i remains linked to terrorist
1 or (b) terrorist i is in a binary cell with some other terrorist j in the organization (which will be
i+ 1 or i− 1 depending on whether i is even or odd). In case (a), the incremental leakage cost for
terrorist i is kγ2(1−αi) (1− α1)α2, while under allocation bα is going to be kγ2(1−αi)α2. Trivially,
kγ2(1−αi) (1− α1)α2 < kγ2(1−αi)α2. In case (b), since the incremental information leakage cost
for terrorists i and i+1 of the N − th link under allocation α is kγ(1−αi)αi+1+ kγ(1−αi+1)αi−
kγ(1− α1)αi − kγ(1− α1)αi+1 (where the first positive terms denote the new information leakage
costs associated with these terrorists and the negative terms the old information leakage costs when
they were subordinates in the N − 1 hierarchy). Since the cell is preferred to making i and i + 1
subordinates to terrorists 1 and 2, it follows that
kγ(1− αi)αi+1 + kγ(1− αi+1)αi − kγα1(1− αi)− kγα1(1− αi+1)
< kγ(α1 + α2(1− α1)γ)(1− αi+1) + kγ(α1 + α2(1− α1)γ)(1− αi)− kγα1(1− αi)− kγα1(1− αi+1)
= kγ2(1− αi) (1− α1)α2 + kγ2(1− αi+1) (1− α1)α2
< kγ2(1− αi)α2 + kγ2(1− αi+1)α2
The last expression is the information leakage cost associated with the allocation bα (that is, the
information leakage costs beyond those incurred in anarchy).
Next, we show that the allocation eα has a lower net benefit for the N−th link eV (N)− eV (N−1)
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than the allocation bα, that is, eV (N)− eV (N−1) ≥ bV (N)− bV (N−1). These two incremental values
can be written down trivially:
eV (N)− eV (N − 1) = t− kγ2 NX
i=3
B
N − 1(1−
B
N − 1) = t− kγ(N − 2)
B
N − 1(1−
B
N − 1)
and
bc(N) = t− kγ2 NX
i=3
α2(1− αi) = t− kγ2(N − 2)α2 + kγ2α2
NX
i=3
αi
Since
PN
i=3 αi < B < N − 2, it follows that information leakage costs under bα are increasing
in α2, whose highest value is BN−1 and when it takes this value the information leakage costs are
equal to those under eα. Thus, ec(N) ≥ bc(N) ≥ c(N). This concludes the proof of Lemma A¥
Let us now proceed to the proof of Proposition 5.
Suppose now that t < kγ BN (1−
B
N ). By Corollary 4, in this case, the symmetric allocation deters
the organization from establishing any link, so this will be the optimal strategy for the enforcement
agency. In the rest of the proof we will then assume that t > kγ BN (1 −
B
N ). In points (1)-(3), we
go over all the possible budget allocations and show that the allocation eα = n0, BN−1 , .., BN−1o is
optimal.
(1) Consider any allocation such that α1 = α2 = 0. Then, the organization can reach full
eﬃciency with zero additional information leakage cost with respect to anarchy. To see this, suppose
that α1 = α2 = 0; then, an organization with the links μ1i = 1 for all i ∈ {2, .., N}, μ21 = 1 and
μij = 0 otherwise engenders full trust in the organization. Thus, it must be the case that, in order
to prevent links between terrorist and deter eﬃciency, at most one terrorist can be left with zero
probability of detection.
(2) Consider any allocation such that α1 > 0—that is, all the probabilities of detections are
set to be positive. Since we are under the assumption that t > kγ BN (1 −
B
N ), if these probabilities
are symmetric, full cooperation will ensue, and the allocation eα cannot do worse than that. Sup-
pose, then, that the allocation is asymmetric–that is, α1 < BN . Following the characterization in
Proposition 3, the terrorists will then form an optimal organization.
First, suppose the parameters are such that the organization has N links. Then, the allocation
we are considering reaches full eﬃciency, and the allocation eα cannot do worse than that.
Suppose, instead, that the optimal organization given the allocation α we are considering gen-
erates N − 1 links. Then, by the Lemma A, allocation eα performs at least as well.
Finally, suppose that under the allocation α there are n < N−1 linked terrorists. We argue that
such a structure is impossible. In such organizations, according to Proposition 1, there are three
types of terrorists to consider: the top of the hierarchy terrorist 1, theN−n−1 independent terrorists
2, ..N − n, and the n terrorists who reveal their information to terrorist 1—that is, N − n+ 1, ..N .
Without loss of generality, we will restrict our attention to the allocations that give the same
probability of detection to each terrorist in the same category (if the probability is not the same, it
is easy to see that it is possible to substitute such probabilities with the average in each category
and still obtain the same structure of organization). Let’s name such probabilities α1, α2 and αN
respectively. The probability allocations we are restricting our attention to have to satisfy the
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following constraints:
(i) 0 < α1 ≤ α2 ≤ αN ≤ 1 (by feasibility and by Proposition 1);
(ii) kγα1(1− α2) ≥ t (it is not optimal for the organization to link the N − n− 1 independent
to terrorist 1);
(iii) t ≥ kγα1(1− αN ) (it is optimal for the organization to link the n terrorists to terrorist 1);
(iv) α1 + (N − n− 1)α2 + nαN ≤ B (the resource constraint).
Note that kγα1(1 − α2) ≤ kγα2(1 − α2) ≤ kγ BN (1 −
B
N ) since α2 ≤
B
N <
1
2 (otherwise either
the (iv) or is violated or it cannot be that α1 ≤ α2 ≤ αN ), but then (ii) cannot hold since
t > kγ BN (1−
B
N ). If follows that such a structure is impossible.
(3) In points (1)-(2) we showed that if t > kγ BN (1−
B
N ), all the allocations such that α1 = α2 = 0
or α1 > 0 are (weakly) dominated by allocation eα. Finally, let us consider an allocation such that
α1 = 0 and α2 > 0. Under this allocation, it is clear that an organization with N−1 linked terrorists
can arise costlessly. Thus, the best the enforcement agency can do is to try to prevent the N − th
link from arising. Observe that, if α1 = 0, the characterization in Proposition 2 yields, for each
i ∈ {4, .., N}, ρ(i − 1.i) ≤ 1 − α2 (easy to check since α2 ≤ αj for all j ∈ {3, .., N}). Then, in
the optimal organization, all the terrorists are linked to terrorist 1, without binary cells (besides
the cell {1, 2}). Then, the cost of the N − th link for the organization is kγα2
PN
i=3 (1− αi), and
it is maximized (under the constraints α2 ≤ αi for all i and
PN
i=2 α1 = B) by αi =
B
N−1 for all
i ∈ {2, .., N}, which is allocation eα.¥
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